We introduce the notion of a middleman in a TU Cooperative game. The middleman engages in intermediary activities which increases the output of every coalition. For this, he offers a scheme of intermediary activities for each coalition. We propose a new parametric class of solutions called the Intermediary values which are characterized using some standard and some nontrivial axioms. We have shown the applicability of the model by means of a couple of numerical examples.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider situations where players may not be individually productive but are crucial in bringing out the synergies among other players. These players are said to be involved in intermediary activities. Such examples can be increasingly found in today's service oriented markets. Consider for instance the role of Grubhub Food Delivery and Takeout Service which is a mobile and online food ordering company that connects diners and corporate businesses with thousands of takeout restaurants. Notice that Grubhub is not productive by itself but it helps in creating synergies among the business houses and the customers. Similar examples in other industries include Uber Cab Services, Groupons etc. To capture these ideas our paper introduces the notion of a middleman in a TU game. The middleman initiates some intermediary activities among the players of the game. A value for the class of TU games with a middlemen that accounts for the intermediary activities is obtained. The value resembles with both the Shapley value (1953) and the core (Peleg and Sudhölter, 2003) in the sense that it is characterized by a set of Shapely like axioms and also accounts for bargaining prospects of the middlemen. Kalai et al. (1978) introduced the notion of a middleman in a cooperative setup and explored the conditions under which an ordinary player decides to become a middleman. A more formal idea in the non-cooperative framework is primarily attributed to the seminal work of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) . In an attempt to model the "one seller-two buyers game model" under cooperative setup, Roth (1988) suggests that the unsuccessful buyer (i.e., with whom the trade deal did not materialize) should buy the good from the seller first and earn some profit according to the Shapley value. He then acts as a middleman by selling the good to the actual buyer. However this interpretation raises questions about why one should hire a middleman instead of trading directly. Alternatively Yavas (1994) introduces the middleman as an intermediate node in the network through which all resources pass by. The role of a middleman here is to facilitate trade in the network. Similar models of a middleman are also found in Arya et al. (2015) , Johri and Leach (2002) , Serrano (1995) etc. In this present model, we look at the notion of a middleman from a different perspective. Each middleman, a player by himself is endowed with some scheme of intermediary activities for which he is given from the grand coalition a fixed intermediary fee. Our model is simple. We assume that the middlemen enable every coalition to earn extra through their presence and this information is known to all the players. We call this an intermediary scheme. A brief comparison of the middleman with some of the existing types of players found in the literature is put in Section 4.2. We obtain a parametric class of values that depend on the fixed intermediary fee to be awarded to the middlemen. The value distributes the worth or profit of the grand coalition among its members. It is then Institute of Science, BHU Varanasi, India characterized using the axioms of linearity (Lin), efficiency (Eff), monotonicity (Mon), anonymity (A) and a new axiom: the axiom of anonymity of middlemen (MA). This axiom implies that each middleman gets the same intermediary fee which is a small portion of the grand coalition. We call this value as the Intermediary value or the I-value. We show by two examples that the I-value is more suitable for games with middlemen in comparison to the Shapley value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we state some preliminary concepts of TU-Games. Section II proposes the model of TU games with middlemen. A value is introduced for this model along with the respective characterization in section IV. Examples are kept in Section V. Section VI includes the concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let the player set be fixed. A transferable utility game (TU Cooperative game or simply a TU game) is a pair where a characteristic function satisfying . Subsets of are called coalitions and the value for each coalition is called its worth. Let denote the universal game space consisting of all TU games and the subclass of with player set . We denote the TU game simply by its characteristic function when the player set is fixed. With some abuse of notation we denote singleton sets without braces. 
B. Values
Recall that a value on assigns some payoff vector to every game As mentioned in the Introduction, one of the most important values in TU games that bears resemblance with our model namely, the Shapley value is given in the following.
C. The Shapley value
The The core is based on stability of the coalitions; on the contrary the Shapley value builds on the principle of fairness. The well known notion of stability suggests that no subset of players has an incentive to break off and work on its own. Recall from Peleg an Sudhölter (2003) , Roth (1988) etc., that the core may be empty and the Shapley value need not be in the core, however if a game is convex then its core exists and the Shapley value lies in the core.
III. TU-GAMES WITH MIDDLEMEN
In what follows we present a simple model describing how middlemen can be involved in intermediary activities under a cooperative game theoretic framework. Recall that a middleman is a player in who by means of intermediary activities can help a coalition generate extra value though he himself cannot generate any worth of his own. Thus we have the following.
DEFINITION 1. A TU-game
with is said to be a TU-game with middlemen or simply a middlemen game if there is a subset satisfying the following conditions.
(i) For each with
It follows from conditions (i) and (ii) in (3.1) that the members of ensure more worth to a coalition than those of . However they are totally unproductive among themselves (condition (iii)). Call each player in a middleman and the remaining players in beneficiaries. Let us denote a middleman game by the triple , where is the set of middlemen. If there is no ambiguity of the player set , we use to denote the middlemen game . Note that a middlemen game can have at most middlemen. Let denote the set of all middlemen games with player set .
It is observed that the Shapley value is not so accommodative in distinguishing the beneficiaries and the middlemen in a middlemen game and does not necessarily lie in the core as well, this we have shown in section 5 with a couple of examples. Therefore in what follows next, we propose a new parametric family of values for the middlemen game in which the parameters can be so estimated that it lies in the core also. The idea is simple. In our model the middlemen help the coalitions to earn more worth and in return they would ask for some intermediary fee which is a proportion of the worth of the grand coalition. The players will be allocated the remaining portion of the worth after the middlemen are paid their intermediary fee.
IV. THE CLASS OF I-VALUES FOR

Let
. We develop a unique value for employing a set of fairness axioms which arise naturally from the model setup itself. Following Weber's (1988) approach the first axiom is that of linearity (Lin). This however applies to the larger class of TU-games. Throughout this paper, we assume that the middlemen satisfy the anonymity assumption. Note that for every . We let
We call the set a Scheme of Intermediary Activities (SIA) in .
Based on the intuition of anonymity of the middlemen, we make the following axiom:
The Axiom of Anonymity of Middlemen (MA): If and are two middlemen, then .
In view of the Axiom MA, there exists a number such that for every . As a consequence, we must have . The parameter is called the intermediary factor of the middlemen. In the Lemma below, we provide another bound for the intermediary factor of the middlemen based on the core condition on .
LEMMA 2.Given and a fixed SIA , if a core solution gives the middleman his intermediary fee then the intermediary factor lies in the interval [ ].
PROOF. Recall that if is a core solution to we must have ∑ and ∑ . Let and be his intermediary factor. Then by the core conditions we must have, ∑ ∑ ∑ The result follows immediately.
By virtue of Lemma 2, we estimate the intermediary factor of each middleman so that the resulting solution is in the core. To emphasize the importance of , we write instead of for middlemen games satisfying the anonymity assumption. As already mentioned above, in the examples in section V, we have shown that the Shapley value for a middleman game may not be in the core. However keeping in the range [ ] and giving the middleman his intermediary fee , we can keep our proposed value in the core. Proof. For and , define the game as follows.
{
Observe that
and is monotonic. Therefore and the result follows. The next axiom anonymity (A) warrants that the co-efficients , and should be identical for coalitions of the equal size.
The axiom of anonymity (A):
For any permutation on , for all where for .
Note that, the axiom of middleman implicitly assumes the anonymity of middlemen. The next lemma follows. (4.7) .
We call the value given by (4.7), the Intermediary value or the I-value in short and denote it by .
From (4.7) , by summing over all , we obtain
∑ ∑ ∏
This can be seen as a consistency condition for the middlemen game. Subject to this consistency condition, we have the I-value parametrized by the intermediary factor . In fact, each gives one I-value for the middlemen game. In a particular context, how to choose , depends on the players and the model. This seems to be an interesting question for future research.
A. Independence of the Axioms
The independence of the axioms of Theorem 1 can be seen from the following alternative solutions. If not otherwise stated we denote the middlemen set by in each of the cases.
(i)
Let be defined as follows.
{ Then satisfies all axioms except Eff .
The function satisfies all the axioms other than MA.
(iii) Let be defined as follows. Let denote the lowest labelled player such that and for each , .
{ Then satisfies all the axioms except A .
(iv) Let be defined as follows.
{ { ∑ }
Then satisfies all the axioms except Mon.
(v) Define as follows. Fix an .
{ Thus satisfies all the properties except Lin .
B. Comparison with the Previous Works
Let us compare the middleman with some of the existing player types. The first proposal seems to be due to van den Brink and Funaki (2005) for a -reducing player that gives rise to the Discounted Shapley value proposed by Joosten (1996) and later characterized by Driessen and Radzik (2002) , see also (Calvo and Gutiérrez-López, (2016) ).
For
[ ] a player is called a -reducing player in game if for all . A solution satisfies the -reducing player property if whenever is a -reducing player. The axioms of linearity, symmetry, efficiency and the -reducing player property characterize thediscounted Shapley value. Note that the -reducing player does exactly the opposite of what we have assumed in our model. Further the axiom of middleman pays the middleman with an intermediary fee while the -reducing player property awards the concerned player zero payoff which is clearly understandable as the -reducing player is penalized for reducing worth while the middleman is rewarded for increasing the worth of a coalition.
The second set of models that bears resemblance to our model is due to Casajus and Huettner (2014) who defined a -player as Institute of Science, BHU Varanasi, India follows. Given a , player is a -player in $v\in \G$ if and for all $S\subseteq \N$, . The -player increases or decreases the worth of a coalition $S\subseteq \N$, times her per capita worth. Consequently the -player out axiom (i.e., to give theplayer zero payoff) is defined to obtain a generalized characterization of the class of solidarity values due to Nowak and Radzik (1994) 1 . In Kamijo and Kongo (2012) award each of these types zero payoff. The middleman is similar to the -player due to Casajus and Huettner (2014) and in particular to the proportional and the quasi proportional players due to Kamijo and Kongo (2012) in the sense that the activity of a -player can be considered a special and stylised intermediary activity under the assumption that both and the TU game take only positive values. The middleman and the -player differ by the fact that the middleman is awarded his intermediary fee from the worth of the grand coalition. On the contrary the -player gets nothing even if she is engaged in some stylised intermediary activities (in the case of increasing worth of every coalition) from the game formulation. The present model offers a natural mechanism to reward the middleman.
Our model bears very much similarity with the axiom of -null player payoff due to Radzik and Driessen (2016) .
The axiom of -null player payoff is that if player i is anull player in a game $v\in \gn$ i.e.,
, then
where and a sequence of real numbers. Note that in (missing citation) all -null players get a fix amount from the game, on the contrary in our MA, depends on and is determined under a consensus among the players in .
V. EXAMPLES
In what follows next we present two examples to show the relationship of the I-value with the core and the Shapley value. 1 The solidarity value of is given as follows. and , then . Thus there is a scope for negotiation in our model (in terms of the intermediary fee) to make the I-value flexible enough to satisfy either the core conditions (stability) or the standard Shapley conditions (fairness) or both. Also note that, if we exclude the middlemen from the game, the Shapley value for the players reduces.
The next example shows why such negotiation between the middlemen and the players is important.
EXAMPLE 2. Let
with as the middleman. Take as follows. , ; ,
;
. Let the SIA of be given as , , . Then , , and finally . The Shapley value for is . Note that here the Shapley value does not belong to the core. Thus if the game is played among players , and with the same worths given by and without a middleman, the corresponding Shapley value is which is in the core. Thus comparing the payoffs of each of the players in presence and absence of the middleman it can be easily seen that the players would prefer to play without a middleman. This leaves scope for the players to bargain and negotiate over the intermediary fee. Accordingly the players can be paid as per the I-value after they consensually fix the intermediary fee. Thus if for example, the players and the middleman agree to an intermediary factor of in accordance to Lemma 2, then the I-value will be which is in the core as well. This is eventually a better choice for all the players. The Shapley value is not flexible to accommodate such bargaining activities.
REMARK 1. For a symmetric game i.e., is only dependent on the size of the coalition , we have where for all .
CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new model for TU games involving middlemen who increase the worth of every coalition. The Ivalue is proposed and characterized as a parametric class of solutions which account for intermediary activities among players by the middlemen. The parameter in this class of values can be so estimated that resulting I-value lies in the core. This essentially provides stability to the value. Some interesting observations are made with the help of few examples. We plan to study other models of intermediary activities in both deterministic and stochastic formulations as part of our future work.
